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THE PRIVATE CLUB EXEMPTION TO THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association operated a nonprofit swim-
ming pool for its members and their guests. The Association's bylaws
provided that membership would be open to bona fide residents of the
area within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool. Applicants had to
be approved by a majority of those present at a meeting of either the
membership or the board of directors. A black couple bought a home
located within the three-quarter mile radius. In 1968 they applied
for membership in the Association, but the board of directors refused
their application. Previously, two white members of Wheaton-Haven
had brought a black guest to the club pool. Thereafter, Wheaton-
Haven adopted a new rule limiting guests to relatives of members.
The black couple, white members, and the black guest joined as plain-
tiffs and sought to enjoin Wheaton-Haven from denying membership
on the basis of race. Plaintiffs contended that Wheaton-Haven was an
entertainment establishment within the scope of the public accom-
modations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and not a pri-
vate club, which is expressly exempted under the Act.2 A federal
district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,3
the Fourth Circuit afirmed,4 and plaintiffs appealed.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970) provides in part:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimi-
nation or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place
of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its opera-
tions affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported
by State action:(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment ....
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970) provides: "The provisions of this subchapter
shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the
public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made
available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of
subsection (b) of this section."
3. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
4. Id. at 1220.
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In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Associations the Supreme
Court held that Wheaton-Haven was not a private club within
the meaning of section 2000a (e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court based its holding on an earlier decision in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc.,6 as well as on a finding that membership
in Wheaton-Haven was open to every white person in the geographic
area. The Court noted that the only restrictions were "the stated
maximum number of memberships and, as in Sullivan, ... the re-
quirement of formal board or membership approval." 7
Generally, courts have failed to employ uniform criteria in deciding
what constitutes a private club under the 1964 Act.8 This tendency is
exemplified by the opposing opinions of the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court in Tillman. The Fourth Circuit found that because
of its structure, membership requirements, social function, and degree
of exclusiveness, Wheaton-Haven qualified as a private club." Yet
the Supreme Court, applying identical criteria, reached the opposite
conclusion.' 0 The different results reached by the Fourth Circuit
5. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
6. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). This case involved a non-stock corporation, organized
for recreational purposes in a residential subdivision, in which a homeowner
could assign his membership to any person renting the home. When the cor-
poration's board refused to approve a membership that had been assigned to
a black because of his race, suit was instituted for both injunctive relief and
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). The Supreme Court granted relief,
holding that the assignment of the membership after renting a member's home fell
under the right to "lease" protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 396 U.S. at
237. The community recreation association could not claim immunity from the
1866 Act on the ground that it was a private club because "there was no plan or
purpose of exclusiveness." Id. at 236.
7. 410 U.S. at 438.
8. The period directly following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
witnessed countless attempts to take advantage of the exemption by means of
reclassifying facilities as private clubs. Virtually all of the establishments chal-
lenged under this Act had initially been operated as public accommodations
and were subsequently reorganized as private clubs. See Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298 (1969); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968). For
this reason it has been a relatively easy matter for the judiciary to employ a "shot-
gun" approach in this area of litigation by enumerating all conceivably relevant
facts and denying the claim for exemptions without formulating a uniform test.
See, e.g., United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La.
1967).
9. 451 F.2d at 1220.
10. 410 U.S. at 438.
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and the Supreme Court in applying these criteria to Tillman illustrate
the difficulty of establishing the parameters of the private dub
exemption.
I. STRUCTURE
The Fourth Circuit emphasized the fact that Wheaton-Haven
was "owned, operated and controlled entirely by its members.""1
Most courts considering private club claims under Title II have
investigated the internal structure of the dub. When a profit motive
and a lack of member-ownership and governance were absent the
structure was deemed inconsistent with the nature of a private dub.12
The Supreme Court, however, looked beyond the form of organiza-
tion to the actual operations of the dub, noting that Wheaton-
Haven did not exhibit any selectivity in its qualifications for ad-
mission.13 This approach is consistent with the Court's decision
in Sullivan in which the requirement of formal board or membership
approval of new members was not automatically determinative
of private club status. Rather, the issue was whether the organization
claiming the exemption could show a "plan or purpose of exclusive-
ness."' 4 The fact that the club was governed by its members was
in itself insufficient to establish private dub status.15
II. OPEN TO GENERAL PUBLIC
Another requirement for private dub status is that the dub be
closed to the general public.', The Fourth Circuit found that Whea-
11. 451 F.2d at 1220.
12. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969). In Daniel Justice
Brennan defined the resort in question as "simply a business operated for a profit
with none of the attributes of self-government and member-ownership traditionally
associated with private clubs." Id. It therefore failed to qualify as a private club
because it was blemished by the existence of a profit-making motive and the ab-
sence of member-ownership or member-control. Id. See also Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.,
397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club,
265 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D. La. 1967); Note, The Private Club Exemption to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1111,
1129-30 (1969).
13. 410 U.S. at 438; see text at notes 6-7 supra.
14. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969).
15. Id. at 234.
16. See note 2 supra. See also Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.
1968).
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ton-Haven's membership was not open to, nor did the Association
purport to serve, all of the general public in any recognizable com-
munity.17 The majority noted that a nearby suburb of Washington,
D.C., a residential area of almost two square miles, would have a
population substantially greater than the population Wheaton-Haven
was designed to serve.15 The majority concluded that although
Wheaton-Haven's bylaws specified that membership would be open
to bona fide residents within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool,
the residents of this area could not be regarded as the "general pub-
lic." The Fourth Circuit found that by limiting its membership
to 325 families, Wheaton-Haven had deliberately avoided any attempt
to serve the community as a whole.1 9
The Supreme Court, however, found that Wheaton-Haven was
open to the white community in the geographic area, despite the fact
that the club's total membership was limited to 325 families.2 0 This
finding was in line with other cases holding that a limit on the number
of memberships is not determinative of exclusiveness. 21 In Castle Hill
Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury22 the formal membership ceiling was
based only on the facility's physical capacity for growth. In CloveT
Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro23 the mere existence of a
membership limit, determined by the number of persons who could
effectively be served, did not change an otherwise public accommoda-
tion into a private one.
A dub may be viewed as holding itself out to the general public if
it either creates an expectation of admission, directly or indirectly,
through advertising 4 or makes its membership incidental to a
public sale or lease of housing.25 The Fourth Circuit noted that
17. 451 F.2d at 1220.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 410 U.S. at 433.
21. Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161
(1966); Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186,
162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
22. 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
23. 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966).
24. See, e.g., Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219
A.2d 161 (1966).
25. In order to decide if Wheaton-Haven qualified as a private club under the
1964 Act, the Fourth Circuit asked whether membership in the club was "so inti-
mately related to an establishment or transaction in which non-discrimination is
[Vol. 8:333
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Wheaton-Haven did not publicly solicit members through adver-
tising.2 6 The court also concluded that, unlike membership in Little
Hunting Park,27 membership in Wheaton-Haven was not incidental
to the purchase of a home from a member2s or of a home within the
geographic area from which Wheaton-Haven drew most of its mem-
bers.2 9 The Supreme Court agreed that Wheaton-Haven did not
advertise its facilities to the general public.30 The Court decided,
however, that certain membership preferences granted only to
property owners within the three-quarter mile radius area3 1 were
required that it can be said to be part of, or ... incident to, the larger, basically
commercial, establishment or transaction." 451 F.2d at 1215. In applying this test,
the court concluded that membership in Wheaton-Haven was not incidental to
the purchase of a home from a member or a home within the geographic area from
which Wheaton-Haven drew most of its members. This standard was derived from
the Fourth Circuit's reading of Sullivan.
26. 451 F.2d at 1220.
27. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969).
28. Under the Wheaton-Haven system, a within-the-area member selling
his home may either retain his membership or seek to sell it back to the Asso-
ciation. If Wheaton-Haven is willing to purchase, it pays 80% of the initial
cost if the membership is not full, and 90% if the membership is full. The
purchaser of the member's home then has a first option on the membership
so released by the seller.
410 U.S. at 436 n.5. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that when a member's home
was purchased, the purchaser got only a first option to be considered for member-
ship in the club, not automatic membership. This option, in the court's view,
meant only that a purchaser would be considered for membership before other per-
sons if there was a waiting list to join the club. Since club membership was not
full and there was no waiting list, the court viewed the option as entitling a new
homeowner to virtually nothing. 451 F.2d at 1217.
29. Plaintiffs had contended that purchase of a home within a three-quarter
mile radius of Wheaton-Haven implicitly carried with it the right to membership
in the club. Distinguishing Wheaton-Haven from Little Hunting Park, the club
in Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit found it "inferable from Little Hunting Park's
organization and membership provision that it was built by the same real estate
developers who built the four subdivisions from which members were drawn, as an
aid to the sale of their homes." 451 F.2d at 1215 n.8. The Supreme Court noted
that this inference might be erroneous, and that "Sullivan did not rest on any
relationship between the club and real estate developers." 410 U.S. at 438 n.9.
30. 410 U.S. at 433.
31. The Supreme Court noted that under Wheaton-Haven's bylaws a resident
of the area within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool received three pre-
ferences over other persons not residing within the three-quarter mile radius:
(1) he is allowed to apply for membership without seeking a recommendation
from a current member; (2) he receives preference over others, except those with
first options, when applying for a membership vacancy; and (3) if he is an owner-
member, he is able to pass to his successor-in-title a first option to acquire the
1974]
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sufficiently incidental to the purchase of the property to be covered by
section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act.32 Specifically, the Supreme
Court found that access to the community swimming pool added
to the value of the homes in the neighborhood that it served,13
and that the homeowner, who became a pool member, obtained a
specific asset (i.e., a first option) that he could convey to the pur-
chaser of his home.34 The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that
Wheaton-Haven did in fact hold itself out to the general public:
When an organization links membership benefits to residency
in a narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those bene-
fits into the bundle of rights for which an individual pays
when buying or leasing within the area. The mandate of 42
U.S.C. § 1982 then operates to guarantee a nonwhite resident,
who purchases, leases or holds this property, the same rights as
are enjoyed by a white resident.35
The Supreme Court's finding that membership in Wheaton-Haven
is covered by section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act because the club
held itself out to the general public is consistent with its decision in
Sullivan.6 The Court in Sullivan stated that the fundamental purpose
of section 1982, protecting the right to "purchase and hold property,"
should not be defeated by giving it a narrow construction.T The
Supreme Court's broad construction of property rights to include
"membership preferences" in Wheaton-Haven is also in harmony
with the public policy behind the Civil Rights Act of 1968,38 since
membership Wheaton-Haven purchases from him. If the membership is full, the
preference area resident is placed on the waiting lst; other applicants are required
to reapply after those on the waiting list obtain memberships. Id. at 436.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."
33. The Supreme Court noted that the automatic waiting list preference given
to residents of the favored area may have affected the price paid by the black
couple who bought their home within the three-quarter mile radius. 410 U.S. at
437.
34. The Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that the sale of a home in
several years might bring a higher price because of the first option to membership
in Wheaton-Haven. Id.
35. Id.
36. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
37. Id. at 237.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42
U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
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the routine exclusion of blacks from neighborhood recreational facili-
ties would discourage them from buying in that neighborhood. To
permit dub membership to serve as a means of indirectly excluding
members of certain groups from a community would violate the Act.
III. SELECTION CRITERIA
Closely connected to the requirement that the club not be open to
the general public is the requirement of selection criteria. A club
must have some definite criteria on which to base its selection of mem-
bers. It cannot employ an arbitrary policy of excluding all blacks and
admitting all whites.39 Although the Fourth Circuit in Tillman noted
that race was employed by the Association as a selection criterion for
membership, it found that qualifications of social and financial stand-
ing were paramount in determining the size of fees and yearly dues
and were an important element of selectivity.40 It is not surprising,
however, that the Supreme Court did not view the payment of yearly
fees and dues as an element of selectivity. 41 Facilities similar to
Wheaton-Haven that require substantial fees and dues have been held
to be "public facilities."42 For the residents of the Wheaton-Haven
area, a $375 initiation fee and annual dues of $50-60 are not a sub-
stantial investment.4 3
39. Traditionally, the determination of whether a club is private, although
involving numerous other factors such as whether the members actually control
the club, the amount of publicity or advertising used to solicit potential members,
and the purpose for which the club is formed, hinges on whether the club selects
its members on some other criteria besides race. United States v. Jordan, 302 F.
Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969). In Jordan, members were selected entirely by the
one person who had been proprietor of the restaurant when it had been previously
operated as a public accommodation, and this precluded the club from being
classified as private. "A private club must have some basis for its selectivity and
must have machinery whereby applications for membership are screened by mem-
bers." Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
40. 451 F.2d at 1221.
41. 410 U.S. at 438.
42. In Bell v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753 (D. Md.
1970), initiation fees were $600 to $1,500 and annual dues were $123 to $138.
In Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161
(1966), new members were required to buy a $350 debenture bond and pay a
yearly fee of $150.
43. Montgomery County, where the Wheaton-Haven pool is located, is one of
the most affluent areas of the country.
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A dub's past record of rejections and acceptances is frequently re-
garded as direct evidence of selectivity. 4 The Fourth Circuit discerned
an element of selectivity in Wheaton-Haven's rejection of one white
family in the club's eleven-year history.45 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed and compared Wheaton-Haven's one rejection in eleven years
with Little Hunting Park's one rejection in twelve years. The Court
concluded in both cases that this record could not be considered as
evidence of selectivity.4- The Supreme Court's interpretation of this
fact is supported by other cases, in which low rejection ratios by alleg-
edly private dubs were fatal to the claim of private dub exemption. 7
IV. SOCIAL FUNCTION
Holding that the statutory exemption for distinctly private organi-
zations is designed to protect the personal associational preferences of
their members, courts demand that the organization claiming exemp-
tion demonstrate a social purpose or function.48 The Fourth Circuit
found that, although Wheaton-Haven's membership was racially identi-
fiable, its makeup exhibited a "discernible basis of commonality other
than a common desire to exclude persons of other races." 40 The
Supreme Court, however, found no "commonality of interest," but
concluded that Wheaton-Haven's sole membership criterion was res-
idence in a defined geographic area.50 The Supreme Court's failure
to find that Wheaton-Haven had a social function is in accord with
other cases. In Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.51 the club was not private be-
cause membership eligibility was determined solely on the basis of
geography. In contrast, the fraternal organization in Moose Lodge
44. Stout v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.,
397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D.
La. 1969).
45. 451 F.2d at 1221.
46. 410 U.S. at 438 n.9.
47. In Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968), only five out of
1,300 applicants were rejected in one year. In Stout v. Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687
(5th Cir. 1968), of 3,070 membership applications in one year, only four were
rejected. In United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969), not one
of 2,400 applications for membership was rejected.
48. Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161
(1966).
49. 451 F.2d at 1221.
50. 410 U.S. at 438.
51. 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
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No. 107 v. Irvis52 was held to be a private club because it had well-
defined membership criteria, evidencing a dear social function as set
forth in its constitution.
CONCLUSION
Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the 1964 civil rights legisla-
tion, saw the private club exemption as protecting only "the genuine
privacy of private dubs or other establishments whose membership
is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis."' 3 Both Senator Hum-
phrey's statement and the Supreme Court's emphasis in Tillman man-
date a judicial probing of the actual operations of the dub, rather
than mere deference to the form of the organization, in order to de-
termine whether the club is actually private. Attributes such as govern-
ment by members, a stated maximum number of memberships, a
record of past rejections, and the existence of dub fees and dues are
not necessarily conclusive of private dub status for the purpose of the
section 2000a (e) exemption. Moreover, after the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Sullivan and Tillman, not only will a club's advertising be
seen as a waiver of the private club exemption, but also an association
that makes its membership incidental to the purchase of a home or
residence in a defined geographic area will be viewed as being public,
quite apart from the issue of admissions qualifications.
Joan Garden
52. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
53. 110 CoNG. REc. 13697 (1964).
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